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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Due process requires, at a minimum, notice and an opportunity to be 
heard. In this case, plaintiff Dawn Hassell intentionally maneuvered to 
deprive non-party Yelp of both. She gave Yelp no notice of her request for 
an injunction against Yelp, preventing the company from responding to her 
unfounded and unlawful requests. Incredibly, Hassell's tactics succeeded 
and she secured a mandatory injunction directing Yelp to remove content 
on its website before it had even been served or had any opportunity to 
oppose the unconstitutional injunction she sought. A clearer violation of 
due process rarely presents itself, and yet the trial court denied Yelp's 
motion to vacate its order and judgment. This Court should reverse and 
vacate the trial court's judgment. 
Non-party Yelp allows members of the public to read and write 
reviews - free of charge - about businesses, government agencies, and 
other local entities, on its website, Y elp.com. Hassell and the law firm she 
owns ("Hassell") sued her former client Ava Bird, alleging that Bird 
authored and posted defamatory statements about Hassell on Yelp's 
website. The lawsuit does not name Yelp as a defendant or seek any relief 
against Yelp, and the only named defendant, Bird, defaulted. Hassell then, 
without providing any notice to Yelp, sought an injunction against Bird and 
Yelp. The court granted the injunction as requested (without separately 
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analyzing whether or not such an injunction was proper as to Yelp) and 
ordered Yelp to remove the statements from its website. 
In the months that followed, after receiving notice of the judgment 
and injunction, Yelp attempted to resolve the dispute with Hassell outside 
of court, explaining that the injunction was void given the lack of due 
process afforded to Yelp, and that Yelp itself was immune from such an 
injunction under Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act 
("Section 230" or "CD A''). When its attempts were unsuccessful, Yelp 
moved the trial court to vacate the judgment. The trial court rejected 
Yelp's due process arguments on the ground that Yelp was "acting in 
concert" with Bird due to Yelp's attempts to overturn the injunction and its 
continued publication of the content at issue. The trial court did not address 
Yelp's Section 230 arguments in its decision. 
This Court should reverse and vacate the trial court's judgment for 
three reasons. 
First, the court's issuance of an injunction without notice to Yelp 
denied Yelp its due process rights. Hassell's intentional decision to not 
provide Yelp with any notice of her application for an injunction deprived 
Yelp of the ability to object and prevent entry of the injunction. No 
evidence supports the trial court's primary reason for refusing to vacate the 
injunction- that Yelp purportedly acted in concert with Bird in some way. 
The trial court's conclusion to the contrary overlooks that as a matter of 
2 
law, simply continuing to display third-party authored content on its 
website cannot transform Yelp into an aider or abetter. Yelp's decision not 
to remove the reviews from its website reflects nothing more than Yelp's 
legitimate objections to, and its refusal to comply with, an injunction that 
ignored the federal immunity that Yelp enjoys under Section 230, and is 
unconstitutional on its face. The legal arguments Yelp made in seeking 
relief from the void injunction merely reflect Yelp's determination to assert 
its statutory and constitutional rights. In addition, the injunction is void for 
the independent reason that it violates the notice requirements of due 
process protected by Code of Civil Procedure Section 580 which provides 
that a default judgment cannot award relief greater than that sought in the 
complaint. Here, having sought an injunction only against Bird in her 
Complaint, Hassell cannot obtain an injunction against Yelp as part of a 
default judgment. See infra at Argument I. 
Second, federal law that was enacted with companies like Yelp in 
mind-47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l)-prohibits courts from ordering website 
providers like Yelp to remove content provided by third parties. Yelp did 
not author the allegedly defamatory statements at issue. Hassell alleges that 
Yelp was an "active participant" in publishing the information, but such 
editorial conduct is precisely what Section 230 shields. Every entity 
protected by Section 230 takes action to publish third-party content, and 
there is no "operative distinction between 'active' and 'passive' Internet 
3 
use" for purposes of applying immunity under Section 230. Barrett v. 
Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 62 (2006). None of the practices that Hassell 
identified below transfonn Yelp into the creator or developer of the 
comments, and as such, Yelp is immune from an injunction. See infra at 
Argument II. 
Third, the injunction is overbroad, and thus constitutes an 
unconstitutional prior restraint against speech. The injunction purports to 
prevent two unnamed users from posting any future reviews on Yelp's 
website, regardless of topic or content. The injunction here also applies to 
two statements that were not properly before the trial court, as Hassell 
failed to identify them with particularity as libelous statements in the 
Complaint. Indeed, one of the two statements was not posted on Yelp until 
months after Hassell filed and served her Complaint. As such, Hassell 
cannot overcome the heavy presumption against this prior restraint's 
constitutional validity. See infra at Argument III. 
For all these reasons, the trial court's denial ofYelp's motion to 
vacate should be reversed. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
A. Yelp Learns that the Trial Court, without Notice, Has 
Entered Judgment Against It in a Lawsuit to which It 
Was Not a Party. 
Yelp's website, Yelp.com, allows members of the public to read and 
write reviews about local businesses, govermnent services, and other 
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entities. A00240, ~ 2. Yelp is available to the public at no charge and 
without any registration requirement. Id. ~ 4. Those who register by 
creating an account may write reviews about businesses and service 
providers, and thus contribute to a growing body of publicly-available 
consumer reviews. A00240, ~ 6. The reviews on Y elp.com are read by 
tens of millions of other users when making a wide range of consumer and 
other decisions. !d. The website provides both a search function and a 
.social network to its users. !d.,~ 2. 
On January 28, 2014, Yelp's registered agent for service of process 
received notice of entry of judgment or order, together with a letter 
threatening Yelp with contempt proceedings if it did not comply with the 
order. A00537-547. Yelp had never been served or otherwise notified that 
the plaintiff in the action, Dawn Hassell, had asked a trial court to enter a 
mandatory injunction compelling Yelp to remove both existing and future 
third-party content from its website. A00243, ~~ 3-5. 
Yelp soon learned that Hassell is an attorney located in San 
Francisco and owns The Hassell Law Group, P.C. A00006, ~~ 21, 22. 
Hassell and her finn had sued Ava Bird, a resident of Berkeley, California. 
A00002 ~ 1. According to Hassell's Complaint, Bird had suffered a 
personal injury on June 16, 2012, and first met with The Hassell Law 
Group on July 9, 2012, to discuss hiring Hassell to represent her in a 
personal injury suit. A00003, ~ 5. On August 20, 2012, Bird returned a 
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signed copy of Hassell's attorney-client fee agreement and thus hired The 
Hassell Law Group. A00003, ~ 7. Hassell claims that thereafter, her firm 
contacted Bird's insurance company and communicated with Bird herself. 
A00004, ~~ 9 and !0. On September 13, 2012, Hassell withdrew from legal 
representation of Bird. A00003, ~ 8. 
1. Third-party users write negative reviews about 
Hassell Law Group on Y elp.com. 
On January 28, 2013, a user with the screen name "Birdzeye B.", 
identified as located in Los Angeles, CA, posted a one-star review (out of a 
possible five stars) of The Hassell Law Group on Yelp.com, complaining 
that "dawn hassell made a bad situation much worse for me. she told me 
she could help with my personal injury case ... then reneged on the case 
because her mom had a broken leg, or something like that, and that the 
insurance company was too much for her to handle." The review went on 
to state, "the hassell law group didn't ever speak with the insurance 
company either, neglecting their said responsibilities and not living up to 
their own legal contract! nor did they bother to communicate with me, the 
client or the insurance company AT ALL." AOOO 18. 
Believing that "Birdzeye B." was Bird, Hassell sent Bird an email on 
January 28, 2013, requesting she remove the "factual inaccuracies and 
defamatory remarks" from Yelp.com. A00005, ~ 15. Bird sent a reply 
email the next day, complaining about Hassell's representation, stating, 
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"the few calls you did make to the insurance were feeble: once to say you 
were handling the case, once you left a belated non-sense voicemail and 
once you called them to withdraw from the case. [B]ut, at no time, DID 
YOU ACTUALLY FOLLOW THROUGH ON ANYTHING 
SUBSTANTIAL!" A00348. The email also indicated that Hassell's 
landlord might write a review as well. A00350. 
On February 6, 2013, a new one star review for The Hassell Law 
Group appeared on Yelp from a different user account with the screen name 
"J.D.," identified as being located in Alameda, California. The review 
stated, "Did not like the fact that they charged me their client to make 
COPIES, send out FAXES, POSTAGE, AND FOR MAKING PHONE 
CALLS about my case!!! Isn't that your job. That's just ridiculous!!! 
They [d]educted all those expenses out of my settlement." A00020. The 
firm's apparently standard attorney-client fee agreement does provide that 
costs, including making copies, faxing, postage, and phone calls, are 
deducted from settlement amounts. See A0007l. 
Hassell alleges that the firm "conducted a diligent and 
comprehensive investigation to detennine if plaintiffs had ever represented 
anyone with the initials 'J.D.' from Alameda and determined that plaintiffs 
had not done so." A00005, ~ 18. Despite the fact that the author of the 
review could plainly be using a pseudonym, that Bird's initials were also 
not J.D., that Bird had not received any settlement amount, and that she had 
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not previously used capital letters at the beginning of her sentences, Hassell 
assumed that the poster "J.D." was Bird, based solely on the use of 
capitalization and the dates of the reviews. A00005, ~ 18. 
2. Hassell brings a defamation suit against Bird based 
on the "Birdzeye B." Review. 
On April I 0, 2014, both Dawn Hassell individually, and the Hassell 
Law Group P.C., filed a complaint against Bird in San Francisco Superior 
Court. See A00002. The suit included claims for libel, trade libel, invasion 
of privacy- false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
sought both compensatory and punitive damages. It also sought injunctive 
relief against Bird only. See A00013:6-13. While the Complaint 
referenced the review by "J.D." dated February 6, 2013, and attached that 
review as Exhibit C, it did not identify the statements with particularity as 
defamatory statements, or explain what was allegedly libelous about them, 
as it did with Birdzeye B.'s review. See A0006-8, ~ 26 (a)-(g), ~ 27 (a)-(g). 
Hassell's process server began attempting personal service at what 
he believed to be Bird's home in Oakland on Aprill3, 2013 (despite 
Hassell's Complaint stating that Bird resided in Berkeley and that the Yelp 
profile page for Birdzeye B. describes the user's location as Los Angeles). 
See A00026. Four days later, on April 17 at 8:30a.m., Hassell relied on 
substitute service. The neighbor with whom the process server left the 
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documents said that "he owns [the] property and hasn't seen her [sic] in a 
couple months." A00026. 
On June 20,2013, Hassell sought an entry of default against Bird. 
See A00022. The Court rejected the request as premature and incomplete. 
!d. 
On July 11, 2013, the court entered a default against Bird because 
she failed to appear and contest the allegations of Hassell's Complaint. 
A00023. 
3. The trial court awards an injunction, without 
notice, against non-party Yelp, enjoining three 
statements and all future speech of two user 
accounts. 
On November 1, 2013, Hassell filed a Summary of the Case in 
Support of Default Judgment and Request for Injunctive Relief that differed 
from the Complaint in a number of significant respects. 
First, Hassell expanded her libel claim and sought relief based on 
three reviews, when the Complaint had only identified statements with 
particularity from one review. Compare A00033-36 with A00006-08. In 
addition to BirdzEye B.'s January 28, 2013 review, which was the basis of 
the libel claim in the Complaint (A000006-08), her Summary of the Case in 
support of her Application for Default Judgment and Request for Injunctive 
Relief also sought to enjoin the "J.D." review, which merely stated that the 
poster "did not like" the firm's admitted policy of deducting from clients' 
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settlements for costs of the firm making copies, sending faxes, using 
postage and making phone calls, and then opined, "Isn't that your job. 
That's just ridiculous!!" A00050-51. Hassell argued-for the first time-
that this review was "accusing Plaintiff of a crime, either fraud or theft by 
taking more money from the recovery than Plaintiff was allowed." A00035 
at 6:20-23. 
The Summary also sought relief for statements that were posted on 
April29, 2013, after Hassell had filed the Complaint, which was never 
amended. A00036, A00050-51. The comments, posted by "Birdzeye B." 
were an update on the original review, and stated that Hassell: 
"has filed a lawsuit against me over this review I 
posted on yelp! she has tried to threaten, bully, 
intimidate, harass me into removing the review! she 
actually hired another bad attorney to fight this. lol! 
well, looks like my original review has turned out to be 
truer than ever. avoid this business like the plague 
folks! and the staff at YELP has stepped up and is 
defending my right to post a review. once again, 
thanks YELP! And I have reported her actions to the 
Better Business Bureau as well, so they have a record 
of how she handles business. [A]nother good resource 
is the BBB, by the way."1 
AOO I 02. Hassell explained in her Summary that the update "implies again 
that Plaintiffs are unethical in their business practices." A00036 at 7:13. 
1 In response to this posting, Dawn H. of The Hassell Law Group responded 
on Y elp.com, writing a lengthy explanation of her view of the events, 
including that "The statements in this review are simply not TRUE." See 
A00244. 
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Second, Hassell significantly expanded the relief being sought. In 
addition to seeking over a half million dollars in damages, Hassell for the 
first time demanded that the "Court should also make an order compelling 
Defendant and Yelp.com to remove the defamatory statements, including 
all 3 entire posts, immediately. If for any reason Defendant does not 
remove them all by the Court-ordered deadline (which is likely given 
Defendant's refusal to answer the complaint), the Court should order 
Yelp.com to remove all3 of them." A00051 at 22:2-6 (emphasis in 
original). 
Plaintiffs' Request for Judgment went even further. There, Hassell 
sought "an Order ordering Y elp.com to remove the reviews and subsequent 
comments of the reviewer within 7 business days of the date of the court's 
Order." A00051 at 22:25-26 (emphasis added). Thus, based on speculation 
that Bird posted as both Birdzeye B. and J.D., Hassell sought to enjoin any 
future speech by these users, and Yelp's display of that speech, regardless 
of whether any future comment might be true, or constitutionally protected 
opinion, or on a different topic, or absolutely privileged. 
Even though the speech at issue was on Y elp.com and she 
specifically sought an order enjoining Yelp's publication of that speech, 
Hassell did not serve her application for default judgment on Yelp. The 
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court granted the requested injunction. See A00213 at 2:7-9.2 The court 
did not make any factual fmdings as to non-party Yelp. 
B. Yelp Moves the Trial Court to Vacate the Injunction of 
Which It Had No Prior Notice. 
On January 28, 2014, Hassell sent a letter attaching the Order to 
Yelp's registered agent of process, with a Notice of Entry of Judgment or 
Order. A00537-547. In the letter, Hassell threatened that "Yelp, Inc.'s 
non-compliance with the court's order will become the subject of contempt 
proceedings and a further lawsuit against Yelp if Yelp refuses to comply as 
my business is being further damaged." A00537. 
On February 3, 2014, Yelp's Senior Director of Litigation, Aaron 
Schur, responded to Hassell by letter. He stated that as a non-party who did 
not receive notice or an opportunity to be heard, Yelp was not bound by the 
terms of the Judgment. A00548-550. He further explained that the 
Communications Decency Act Section 230 precludes enforcement of the 
injunction, or liability as to Yelp, given that Hassell's claim arose from 
third-party content published on Yelp's website. A00549. Finally, Mr. 
Schur stated that "your threats against Yelp are not well taken. If you 
pursue an action against Yelp premised on its publication of these reviews, 
Yelp will promptly seek dismissal of such action and its attorneys' fees 
2 The court also accepted Hassell's representations about the damages she 
suffered and ordered that Bird pay Hassell over half a million dollars in 
monetary damages. See A00212. 
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under California's anti-SLAPP law, as it has in the past in similar cases." 
A00550. 
Hassell did not respond until April 30, 2014, nearly three months 
later. In a letter bearing that date, she claimed that her office was 
"currently setting a motion to enforce the court's order against Yelp." 
A0055l. She did not respond or acknowledge Yelp's arguments that the 
injunction was procedurally and substantively improper. 
On May 23, 2014, Yelp moved the court to vacate the Judgment. 
A00225-226. Yelp argued that the Judgment was void because it (a) was 
issued without notice or an opportunity for Yelp to be heard, and thus 
violated Yelp's due process rights; (b) exceeded the scope of relief 
requested in the Complaint, and was therefore barred by Code Civ. Proc. § 
580; (c) was prohibited under Section 230 of the Federal Communications 
Decency Act; and (d) was issued in violation of the First Amendment. 
A00231-36. 
C. Hassell Opposes the Motion to Vacate, Claiming that Yelp 
is "Aiding and Abetting" Defendant Bird by Challenging 
the Injunction. 
Hassell opposed Yelp's motion to vacate. She argued that Yelp's 
motion to vacate was untimely, and that the court's authority to rule on the 
motion to set aside and vacate the judgment had expired. A00480: 1-
A00481: 19. She also argued, for the first time in the litigation, that the lack 
of notice and due process afforded to Yelp was permissible because (I) it 
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"was the only meaningful remedy available to Plaintiff' and (2) Yelp was 
allegedly "acting in concert with Defendant Bird." A00481 :20-21. 
Similarly, Hassell argued that Section 230 did not bar injunctive relief 
against Yelp because Yelp was "actively participating in promoting the 
defamation of Plaintiffs." A00486: 19-20. 
Hassell primarily based her argument that Yelp was "acting in 
concert" with Bird on Yelp's refusal to comply with an injunction that Yelp 
had received no prior notice of or an opportunity to contest before it was 
entered. A00482:27-A00483:3. Hassell argued that "Yelp's continued 
persistence refusing to take down Bird's review has caused and continues 
to cause i~ury to Plaintiffs, but Yelp has done nothing and here defends 
itself and Ava Bird arguing that the findings against Bird are even invalid!" 
A00483: 18-21 (emphasis in original). Thus, according to Hassell, Yelp's 
act of merely challenging the validity of the injunction against Yelp, 
pointing out that it was entered without prior notice to Yelp, was itself 
sufficient evidence of Yelp "aiding and abetting" Bird. 
In addition, Hassell argued that "Yelp has maintained and classified 
the 'Birdzeye' review as a 'Recommended Review' constituting action by 
Yelp of representing the review as truthful." A00483:4-5. In support of 
this argument, Hassell submitted a print-out from Yelp's website for The 
Hassell Law Group. A00518. It showed that The Hassell Law Group had 
an average ranking of four and a half stars -half a star short of the highest 
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possible ranking- based on 12 reviews. The 12 reviews were listed under 
the small heading, "Recommended Reviews for The Hassell Law Group"-
the same heading format used for all reviewed businesses listed on Yelp's 
website. Birdzeye B's review, with Dawn H's comment in response below 
it, were listed among the 12. On a separate web-page, Yelp displayed a 
number of reviews for The Hassell Law Group that are currently not 
recommended. A00519. This included the J.D. review, about which 
Hassell also complains, as well as nine other reviews that Hassell claimed 
were positive. The page also included the following explanation from 
Yelp: 
What Are Recommended Reviews? 
We get millions of reviews from our users, so we use 
automated software to recommend the ones that are 
most helpful for the Yelp community. The software 
looks at dozens of different signals, including various 
measures of quality, reliability, and activity on Yelp. 
The process has nothing to do with whether a business 
advertises on Yelp or not. The reviews that currently 
don't make the cut are listed below and are not 
factored into this business's overall star rating. Learn 
more here. 
A00519. 
Hassell also argued that Yelp was "acting in concert with Bird" 
because "Yelp's Terms of Services expressly state that a Yelp user agrees 
to not post defamatory reviews," and Yelp "chose not to enforce its own 
rules prohibiting defamatory reviews." A00483:5-6, 14-15. 
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Finally, Hassell argued that Yelp's Terms of Service created an 
agent-principal relationship with Bird through licensing provisions. 
A00484:11-16. 
In its reply brief and at oral argument, Yelp contested each of these 
arguments and repeatedly represented that it was not acting on behalf of 
Bird. 
D. The Trial Court Denies the Motion to Vacate and this 
Appeal Follows. 
On September 29, 2014, the trial court denied Yelp's motion to set 
aside and vacate the judgment. A00808. It quoted from Ross v. Superior 
Court, 19 Cal. 3d 899, 906 (1977), and Berger v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 
719, 721 ( 1917), for the proposition that injunctions may run to non-parties 
who are aiding and abetting an enjoined person to violate an injunction. It 
found "a factual basis to support Hassell's contention that Yelp is aiding 
and abetting Bird's violation of the injunction." A00809. 
First, it described Yelp's automated software that distinguished 
between "recommended" and "not recommended" reviews as evidence 
"that Yelp highlighted at least one ofBird's defamatory reviews about the 
Hassell Law Firm on its website by featuring it as a 'Recommended 
Review."' A00809. The court also noted that "Yelp's website also 
indicates that a litany of favorable reviews are not factored into the Hassell 
Law Firm's star rating, appearing to give emphasis to Bird's defamatory 
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review." Id. The court failed to acknowledge that the Birdzeye B. review 
was displayed as "recommended" prior to the entry of the injunction, that 
Yelp's system of categorizing reviews as "recommended" or "not 
recommended" undisputedly occurs through automated software, or that 
Yelp's recommendation software system was also in operation before the 
entry of the injunction. A00519 .3 Thus, no facts demonstrated that Yelp 
took any intentional act to conspire with Bird to thwart the injunction. 
Second, the court believed that Yelp was "acting on behalf of Bird" 
by moving to set aside the judgment in its entirety, even though Yelp had 
alternatively asked for the judgment to be partially vacated to eliminate all 
provisions pertaining to Yelp. The court stated that it concluded that Yelp 
was "acting on behalf of Bird" because Yelp argued that Hassell had failed 
to establish that Bird actually posted the Yelp reviews, and that Hassell had 
not properly effectuated substitute service on Bird. A00809. The court 
described these arguments as having been made "on behalf of Bird," 
despite acknowledging Yelp's contention that "it is an uninterested third 
party." The court stated that there was "a unity of interest between Bird 
and Yelp." A00810. 
Third, the court believed that Yelp was aiding and abetting the 
alleged ongoing violation ofthe injunction because "Yelp refuses to delete" 
3 See also http://officialblog.yelp.com/2013/lllyelp-recommended-
reviews.html 
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the reviews, and claimed that Yelp's refusal is inconsistent with its Terms 
of Service, which requires its users not to write defamatory reviews (but 
does not represent that Yelp will remove all allegedly defamatory reviews). 
A00810. 
The court did not address Yelp's argument that the initial grant of 
the injunction against Yelp- which occurred before Yelp had notice or an 
opportunity to argue on its behalf, and before Hassell had provided any 
evidence or argument regarding "recommended reviews"- was void. Nor 
did the court make any reference to or discuss the immunity provided by 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court should conduct an independent, de novo review of the 
trial court's denial of Yelp's Motion to Vacate. Both the United States and 
California Supreme Courts have held that appellate courts, when reviewing 
appeals raising fundamental issues of free speech such as Yelp has raised 
here, should exercise independent appellate review. In Bose Corp. v. 
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 5!0-11 (!984) the United 
States Supreme Court made clear that "[t]he requirement of independent 
appellate review reiterated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is a rule of 
federal constitutional law .... It reflects a deeply held conviction that 
judges-and particularly Members of this Court-must exercise such 
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review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained 
by the Constitution." 
The California Supreme Court echoed those sentiments in In re 
George T., 33 Cal. 4th 620, 632 (2004): "What is evident is that the high 
court has employed the independent review standard in varied First 
Amendment contexts as an added safeguard against infringement of First 
Amendment rights." The Supreme Court further instructed that a reviewing 
court must "make an independent examination of the whole record, 
including a review of the constitutionally relevant facts de novo, 
independently of any previous determinations by [the lower court]." Id. at 
634 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because application 
of Section 230 raises First Amendment issues as well (see Argument II, 
below), independent review is also appropriate. And, of course, when 
deciding "the proper interpretation and application of a statute or 
constitutional provision, our review is de novo." In re Lugo, 164 Cal. App. 
4th 1522, 1535 (2008). 
Similarly, the law is clear that questions regarding an appellant's due 
process rights are matters of law subject to independent review. See 
Mohilefv. Janovici, 51 Cal. App. 4th 267, 285 (1996) ("Because the 
[appellants'] contention regarding procedural matters presents a pure 
question of law involving the application of the due process clause, we 
review the trial court's decision de novo"); In re A.B., 230 Cal. App. 4th 
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1420, 1434 (2014) ("Mother's due process contentions present an issue of 
law which we review de novo"); Menge v. Reed, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1134, 
1139 (2000) ("Whether the DMV's administrative procedures comply with 
due process is a question oflaw, and we review the trial court's 
determination of that question de novo"). 
De novo review by this Court is also required under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 663. Appellate review of a denial of a motion 
under section 663 is ordinarily limited "to a determination of whether the 
conclusions of law and judgment are consistent with and supported by the 
findings of fact." Newbury v. Civil Serv. Comm 'n of City of Los Angeles, 
42 Cal. App. 2d 258, 259 (1940). Whether the trial court has drawn an 
incorrect legal conclusion from the facts found is a question of law to 
which the Court applies de novo review. See, e.g., People ex rel. Dep 't of 
Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 1135, 1144 
( 1999). Likewise, "[ c ]onstruction and application of a statute involve 
questions of law, which require independent review." Delfino v. Agilent 
Techs., Inc., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790 (2006) (citations omitted); see also 
Howard Contracting, Inc. v. G.A. MacDonald Constr. Co., 71 Cal. App. 
4th 38, 49 (1998). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DUE PROCESS BARS THE INJUNCTION AGAINST 
YELP 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Yelp's Motion to 
Vacate the Injunction, Which Violates Yelp's Due Process 
Rights. 
The trial court's order denying Yelp's motion to vacate should be 
overturned because the injunction violates Yelp's due process rights under 
both the United States and California Constitutions. The requirement of 
notice and hearing is firmly rooted in principles of justice, and indeed, the 
United States and California Constitutions.4 As the court made clear in 
Estate of Buchman, 123 Cal. App. 2d 546, 559 (1954), "The fundamental 
conception of a court of justice is condenmation only after notice and 
hearing." The court further noted that "[t]he power vested in a judge is to 
hear and determine, not to determine without hearing," and that the 
Constitution requires a fair hearing. !d. at 560. See also People v. 
Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260,263-64 (1979) (holding that application of the due 
process clauses of the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I,§ 7 subd. 
(a); id., § 15.), "must be determined in the context of the individual's due 
process liberty interest in freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures"); 
Kash Enters., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 3d 294, 308 (1977) ("the 
4 Although interpretations of the scope of the Due Process clause of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are not binding on interpretations of the 
Due Process clauses of the California Constitution, Courts generally apply 
such holdings unless given a reason not to do so. See, e.g., Garfinkle v. 
Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 268,282 (1978). 
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Constitution generally requires that an individual be accorded notice and 
some fonn of hearing before he is deprived of a protected property or 
liberty interest"); Today 's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Office of 
Educ., 57 Cal. 4th 197,212 (2013) ("The essence of due process is the 
requirement that a person in jeopardy of serious loss be given notice of the 
case against him and opportunity to meet it.") (internal marks and citations 
omitted); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 547 (1971) 
(recognizing "the long-standing procedural due process principle which 
dictates that, except in extraordinary circumstances, an individual may not 
be deprived of his life, liberty or property without notice and hearing"). 
Consequently, as the United States Supreme Court has held, courts 
"may not grant an enforcement order or injunction so broad as to make 
punishable the conduct of persons who act independently and whose rights 
have not been adjudged according to law." Regal Knitwear Co. v. N.L.R.B., 
324 U.S. 9, 13 (1945). And the Supreme Court of California long ago 
reaffirmed as a "seemingly self-evident proposition that a judgment in 
personam may not be entered against one not a party to the action." Fazzi 
v. Peters, 68 Cal. 2d 590, 591 (1968). As one court later observed, 
"[r]endering a judgment for or against a nonparty to a lawsuit may 
constitute denial of due process under the United States and California 
Constitutions" because the "nonjoined party has not been given notice of 
the proceedings or an opportunity to be heard." Bronco Wine Co. v. Frank 
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A. Logoluso Farms, 214 Cal. App. 3d 699, 717-18 (1989) (citations 
omitted). 
Yet despite this settled constitutional principle, and without Yelp 
having any notice or an opportunity to object to the injunction before it was 
entered, the trial court granted Hassell's request for entry of an injunction 
to enjoin speech hosted by Yelp, violating Yelp's constitutional rights. The 
First Amendment protects Yelp's right to distribute the speech of others 
without an injunction, regardless of the fact that the speech was created and 
developed by others. Yelp simply cannot be denied those rights without 
notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Marcus 
v. Search Warrants of Property, 367 U.S. 717,736-37 (1961) (distributors 
suffered unconstitutional denial of due process where state seized allegedly 
obscene publications without notice or a hearing prior to seizure, impairing 
distributors' freedom of speech). 
Hassell was well aware that Yelp's rights would be implicated when 
she moved for a default judgment; as she put it, she "anticipated that 
Defendant Bird would refuse to remove the Yelp review" and therefore 
"asked the court to also order Yelp to take the review down." A00482 at 
6:14-17. Nevertheless, rather than pursue contempt proceedings against 
Bird, or add Yelp as a defendant to her initial suit and provide notice of this 
action, she instead sought to enjoin Yelp directly knowing that Yelp had 
not been named as a defendant, or served with any summons, pleadings, 
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discovery, subpoenas, or motions, in the Action prior to the Judgment. 
A00243, ~~ 3-5. In fact, at the hearing on the motion to vacate, Hassell 
made the remarkable admission that she did not name Yelp in her 
Complaint because Yelp informed her that it was irmnune from suit under 
Section 230. A00837: 13-15 ("They also told my lawyer that they are 
immune from suit under 230 ... so they were not sued."). 5 In other words, 
because she was convinced of Yelp's Section 230 immunity, she decided to 
wait until she had a default judgment against Bird, then sought to add Yelp 
to the resulting injunction rather than give Yelp an opportunity in court to 
argue its immunity from suit and injunction under Section 230. That is the 
essence of a due process violation. Instead of recognizing this clear 
violation of Yelp's due process rights, however, the trial court granted the 
relief Hassell requested. 6 
5 Yelp's immunity from suit and injunction under Section 230 is discussed 
infra, Argument II. 
6 In a Supplemental Opposition to Nonparty Yelp Inc.'s Reply 
Memorandmn of Points and Authorities, Hassell asserted that Yelp did 
have notice, because Hassell's former counsel had sent Yelp's general 
counsel, not Yelp's registered agent for service of process, a letter in May 
2013, attaching the Complaint - which did not name Yelp as a party - and 
included the boiler plate language in its Prayer for Relief that it sought 
"such other and further relief as the court may deem proper." A00586:3-
24. Of course, if such conduct constituted sufficient notice, California's 
rules regarding service of process would be superfluous and the concept of 
due process would lose all meaning. There is no dispute that Hassell failed 
to serve Yelp with any notice that she was seeking an injunction against 
Yelp before the injunction was issued. 
24 
Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Corp. v. W. Pac. Roofing Corp., 75 Cal. 
App. 4th 110, 120-21 (1999) is instructive. In that case, insurance 
underwriters ("Underwriters") entered into an agreement to reimburse a 
roofing contractor in its litigation against a general contractor. After the 
roofing contractor obtained a judgment against the general contractor (but 
not the Underwriters), the roofing contractor moved for the Underwriters to 
be added as judgment debtors. The trial court granted the contractor's 
motion. Tokio Marine, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 113-15. 
The Court of Appeal reversed, noting that the "Underwriters 
themselves did not assert any claim in this action, and no litigant sued the 
Underwriters in this litigation to determine any issue whatsoever." Tokio 
Marine, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 119. Accordingly, when the trial court granted 
the roofing contractor's motion, the Underwriters were deprived of a 
"summons or complaint setting forth the issues to be joined," "discovery," 
"setting of a trial date," the "opportunity to assemble evidence or witnesses 
on the merits or to prepare for a trial," the "opportunity to brief and be 
heard on the legal issues raised," the "opportunity to cross-examine adverse 
witnesses," and a "trial (either jury or non-jury)." !d. at 120-21. In all, the 
court concluded that the trial court's order "was a rather straightforward 
denial of due process." !d. at 121 (emphasis added). If due process 
requires that insurance underwriters, having entered into a contract 
concerning litigation, be given notice and a hearing before they are bound 
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by any judgment arising from that litigation, then it necessarily requires that 
Yelp also have been given a notice and hearing before being enjoined for 
hosting third-party speech. The conclusion that the Judgment should have 
been vacated on due process grounds alone is inescapable. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Finding the Lack of Notice Was 
Justified. 
The trial court erred in determining that Yelp could be bound by the 
injunction despite having received no prior notice of it or any opportunity 
to object. It relied on Ross v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 899, 906 (1977) 
and Berger v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 719, 721 (1917), which both state, 
"In matters of injunction ... it has been a common practice to make the 
injunction run also to classes of persons through whom the enjoined person 
may act, such as agents, servants, employees, aiders, abetters, etc., though 
not parties to the action." Ross, 10 Cal. 3d at 906, citing Berger, 175 Cal. 
at 721. The trial court believed that there was "a factual basis to support 
Hassell's contention that Yelp is aiding and abetting Bird' s violation of the 
injunction," and on that basis, concluded that the injunction could run to 
non-party Yelp despite the lack of notice. A00809. 
The rule articulated in Ross and Berger however, applies where a 
group or organization has been enjoined, so as to prevent the group's 
individual members who are not named in the injunction from acting on 
behalf of that group. It is, in essence, an administrative solution to secure a 
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group's compliance with an injunction by applying the injunction to its 
individual members. As the Supreme Court clarified in People ex rd 
Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th I 090, 1124 (1997), application of injunctive 
relief to non-parties permitted in Ross and Berger applies "to labor unions, 
abortion protesters or other identifiable groups" because "such groups can 
act only through the medium of their membership" (emphasis added). 
Thus, in Ross, the Supreme Court held that the boards of supervisors were 
bound by an injunction against the state welfare agency because 
"[i]nasmuch as county boards of supervisors bear an on-going statutory 
responsibility for the local administration of welfare benefits, such boards 
of supervisors are clearly general agents of the state welfare agency with 
respect to such administrative duties." 19 Cal. 3d at 908. 
In this case, indisputably however, Bird is not a "group" and Yelp is 
not a member. None of the practical considerations about enjoining 
members of a group that existed in Ross and Berger exist here because 
naming Yelp in the initial complaint and giving Yelp notice and 
opportunity to be heard to object to the injunction would have imposed no 
additional burden on Hassell - other than forcing her to establish her right 
to relief, if any, against Yelp. 
Moreover, even if Ross and Berger were applicable, the facts do not 
support the theory that Yelp was somehow "aiding and abetting" Bird' s 
violation of the injunction. The trial court cited its belief that Yelp 
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"highlighted at least one ofBird's defamatory reviews about the Hassell 
Law Firm on its website by featuring it as a 'Recommended Review"' and 
that Yelp's website failed to factor into Hassell's review "a litany of 
favorable reviews ... appearing to give emphasis to Bird's defamatory 
review." A00809. A closer examination of the Yelp website, however, 
belies the trial court's conclusions. Yelp uses automated software--in 
place for years before the injunction issued- to determine whether a 
review is categorized as "recommended" or "not recommended"; therefore, 
Yelp did not choose to "highlight" any particular review after the injunction 
was issued. See A00519; see also 
http:/ /officialblog. yelp.com/20 13/ ll/yelp-recommended-reviews.html. In 
fact, the review at issue was "recommended" before the injunction existed. 
Merely continuing to host third-party content, and continuing to apply to it 
the same software that is applied to all third-party content, cannot constitute 
aiding and abetting. Yelp did not take any affirmative action at all in 
response to the injunction and instead, as Hassell herself wrote, "has done 
nothing." A00483: 18-2!. 
Further, the trial court found that "Yelp is acting on behalf of Bird" 
by making legal arguments as to the validity of the judgment. A00809. 
But the trial court itself acknowledged that the rule articulated in Ross and 
Berger requires that Yelp be "aiding and abetting Bird's violation of the 
injunction." !d. (emphasis added). Simply asserting legal arguments in 
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court about the validity of the injunction cannot constitute aiding and 
abetting a violation of the injunction. Yelp did nothing more than 
appropriately assert its objections to the constitutionality of the injunction, 
even if some of those arguments would be equally available to Bird. 
Pursuing such defenses in court can hardly be said to be "acting in concert" 
with Bird, or all co-defendants that happen to make arguments that benefit 
the other would be said to be "acting in concert" with each other. Indeed, 
California law provides not only that an Internet service provider protected 
under Section 230 may move to quash a subpoena for personally 
identifying infonnation, where the action is pending in another state; it also 
provides that if the underlying action arises from the service provider's 
exercise of free speech, and if the respondent has failed to make a prima 
facie showing of a cause of action, the successful service provider may be 
awarded attorney's fees for so challenging. See Code Civ. Proc. 
§ 1987.2(c) (providing process for quashing subpoena seeking identity of 
users where issuing party fails to make a prima facie showing of a cause of 
action). Given California's embrace oflnternet service providers 
challenging actions that seek users' personal information, it cannot be the 
law that Yelp's legal arguments as to the validity of the default judgment 
constitute aiding and abetting. 
Finally, the trial court found that Yelp was aiding and abetting Bird 
because its refusal to delete Bird's allegedly defamatory reviews was 
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"inconsistent with its own terms of service." A00810. Yelp's Terms of 
Service, however, require its users not to write defamatory reviews, but 
does not represent that Yelp itself will remove all allegedly defamatory 
reviews. A00561-564. Indeed, in those same Terms of Service, Yelp 
states, "We are under no obligation to enforce the Terms on your behalf 
against another user. While we encourage you to let us know if you believe 
another user has violated the Terms, we reserve the right to investigate and 
take appropriate action at our sole discretion." A00562. 
Nor does Yelp's refusal to remove the reviews pending appeal of the 
injunction constitute aiding and abetting Bird. In Blockowicz v. Williams, 
630 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2010), the court rejected the exact arguments that 
Hassell makes here. It held that a website host was not aiding and abetting 
defendants and could not be compelled to remove defamatory material from 
their website pursuant to a pennanent injunction issued in an action to 
which it was not a party. The court disregarded arguments that- like here 
-the website host's terms of service did not allow users to post defamatory 
content. The court noted that the website host did nothing after receiving 
notice of the injunction, and found that "mere inactivity is simply 
inadequate to render them aiders and abettors in violating the injunction." 
!d. at 568. Similarly here, Yelp's refusal to remove the posts prior to the 
resolution of this appeal cannot render Yelp into an aider or abettor. The 
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grant of injunction against Yelp, a non-party to the underlying action, was 
thus a clear violation of Yelp's due process rights. 
C. The Injunction Also Violates the Guarantee of 
Fundamental Fairness Contained in Code of Civil 
Procedure Section 580. 
The entire Judgment, including the injunction against Yelp, is void 
for another reason: it violates the "notice requirements of due process" that 
"lie at the core of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 580." Finney v. 
Gomez, Ill Cal. App. 4th 527, 535 (2003). Section 580 requires that "[t]he 
relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that 
demanded in the complaint." As a result, a "default judgment awarding 
damages in excess of the amount allowed under Section 580 is beyond the 
court's jurisdiction and therefore is void." Matera v. McLeod, 145 Cal. 
App. 4th 44, 59 (2006). The rule applies equally to injunctions. Becker v. 
S.P. V. Constr. Co., 27 Cal. 3d 489, 493-94 (1980). 
California's Supreme Court has affirmed that Section 580 must be 
strictly construed. See Greenup v. Rodman, 42 Cal. 3d 822, 826 (1986). 
That is because Section 580 functions as "a guarantee of fundamental 
fairness." Finney, 111 Cal. App. 4th at 534. "The 'primary purpose of the 
section is to guarantee defaulting parties adequate notice of the maximum 
judgment that may be assessed against them."' In reMarriage of Lippe!, 
51 Cal. 3d 1160, (1990), citing Greenup, 42 Cal. 3d at 826. As the 
California Supreme Court has "repeatedly stated, [Section 580] means what 
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it says and says what it means: that a plaintiff cannot be granted more 
relief than is asked for in the complaint." In reMarriage of Lippe!, 51 Cal. 
3d at 1166. 
Here, the Complaint only requested injunctive relief as to Bird, but 
the Judgment ordered mandatory injunctive relief against Yelp. And while 
the injunctive relief sought in the Complaint was limited to removal of 
comments already posted on the Internet "about plaintiffs," (A000!3:24), 
the Judgment provided much broader relief, extending the injunction to 
future comments on any topic. A00212-213. In addition, the Complaint 
identified with particularity only statements from one review, the first 
review from Birdzeye B. A00006:22-A00008:7. The Judgment, however, 
was based on three statements, one of which had not yet been posted at the 
time the Complaint was filed. A00050-51 ("The Court should also make an 
order compelling Defendant and Y elp.com to remove the defamatory 
statements, including all 3 entire posts, immediately"). These violations of 
Section 580 require reversal of the trial court's ruling. 
II. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT BARS THE 
INJUNCTION AGAINST YELP 
The Internet has effected one of the greatest expansions of free 
speech and communications in history. It is "a tool for bringing together 
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the small contributions of millions of people and making them matter."7 
Today, more than 2. 7 billion people use the Internet, submitting and 
viewing hundreds of millions of posts, comments, photos, videos and other 
content every day.8 As the Supreme Court put it, "the content on the 
Internet is as diverse as human thought." Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties 
Union, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997) (citation omitted). 
This is no accident. In 1996, to promote the free flow of information 
on the Internet, Congress resolved to protect websites and other online 
providers from state-law liability for their users' content. Section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act embodies that command, prohibiting 
courts from treating such a provider as the "publisher or speaker" of third-
party content or holding it liable for taking steps to screen such material. 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l). Grounded in core First Amendment principles, 
Section 230 offers strong protection for innovation and expansion of free 
speech on the Internet. Since its enactment, federal and state courts have 
consistently interpreted it to provide a "robust" immunity to companies that 
7 Lev Grossman, You- Yes, You -Are TIME's Person of the Year, TIME 
MAGAZINE (Dec. 25, 2006). 
8 International Telecommunications Union, 2013 ICT Facts & Figures, 
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures20 !3.pdf; Mary Madden and 
Kathryn Zickuhr, 65% of online adults use social networking sites (Aug. 
26, 20 II), available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/20 11/Social-
Networking-Sites.aspx (as of 20 II, 65% of online adults used social 
networking sites); Josh James, How Much Data Is Created Every Minute? 
(June 8, 2012), available at http://www.domo.com/blog/2012/06/how-
much-data-is-created-every-minute/? dkw=socf3. 
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operate websites, such as Yelp, "from liability for publishing false or 
defamatory material so long as the information was provided by another 
party." Carafano v. Metrosplash.com Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122-23 (9th 
Cir. 2003). In the words of California's Supreme Court, the statute is so 
broad as to provide "blanket immunity for those who intentionally 
redistribute defamatory statements on the internet." Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 
62-63.9 It does so "to protect online freedom of expression and to 
encourage self-regulation, as Congress intended." Id. at 63. 
9 During oral argument on Yelp's motion, the trial court expressed disbelief 
that the statute could mean what the California Supreme Court, and uniform 
federal courts nationwide, have said it means. In first turning to Yelp's 
counsel during the argument, the trial court said, "What you're saying is 
you can post any kind of defamatory information for the world to see, and 
you can say, we don't have anything to do with it. We don't care if they 
say Ms. Hassell shot her mother, or something like that. It doesn't make 
any difference. I think your position is a very hard one to swallow." 
A00834:6-ll. While the Supreme Court expressed similar reservations 
about the statute, it followed Congress' directive and held that as a matter 
oflaw, websites like Yelp cannot be held liable for content posted by third-
parties, regardless of what that content contains. Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 62-
63. See also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026-30 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Almeida v. Amazon. com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (lith Cir. 2006) ("The 
majority of federal circuits have interpreted the CDA to establish broad 
federal innnunity to any cause of action that would make service providers 
liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.") 
(internal citations and quotations omitted); Jones v. Dirty World Entm 't 
Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 402 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding TheDirty.com 
is not an "information content provider" with respect to information it 
publishes such that Section 230(c)(l) bars state-law tort claims predicated 
on that infonnation); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010); 
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413,418 (5th Cir. 2008); Chicago Lawyers' 
Comm.for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 
671 (7th Cir. 2008); Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 
413, 418-19 (1st Cir. 2007); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471 
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Specifically, the Act provides: "No provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider," and it 
preempts any state law, including imposition of tort liability, that is 
inconsistent with its protections. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l) & (e)(3). Thus, 
while a plaintiff may still pursue remedies against the actual creator of 
allegedly unlawful online content, that plaintiff may not pursue common 
law tort claims against a party so long as that party (I) is a "provider or user 
of an interactive computer service"; (2) the complaint seeks to hold the 
defendant liable as a "publisher or speaker"; and (3) the action is based on 
"information provided by another information content provider." /d.; see 
Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 828-29 (2002). 
Section 230 bars the injunction against Yelp, as well as any liability 
for failing to comply with the injunction. First, Yelp qualifies as a provider 
of "an interactive computer service" because it operates a website. 
Universal Commc 'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (lst Cir. 
2007) ("web site operators ... are providers of interactive computer services 
within the meaning of Section 230"); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030 n.l6. 
Second, the injunction against Yelp treats it as a publisher or speaker. See 
Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal. App. 4th 684, 698 (200 I); 
(3d Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 
980,984-85 (lOth Cir. 2000); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 
(4th Cir. 1997). 
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Medytox Solutions, Inc. v. Investorshub.com, Inc., No. 4Dl3-3469, 2014 
WL 6775236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2014). In Kathleen R., this Court 
specifically found that Section 230, by its terms, precludes injunctive relief, 
noting that "claims for ... injunctive relief are no less causes of action than 
tort claims for damages, and thus fall squarely within the section 230( e )(3) 
prohibition." See Kathryn R., 87 Cal. App. 4th at 698. Third, "Birdzeye 
B." and "J.D.," the two users who posted comments on Yelp, are 
"information content providers" because they are wholly responsible for the 
creation of the content of the comments. See 47 U.S. C.§ 230(f)(3). 
Hassell has never alleged, and cannot, that Yelp played any role in the 
authorship ofBirdzeye B. or J.D.'s comments. Consequently, Yelp enjoys 
the immunity of Section 230. 
In the briefing below, Hassell conceded that Yelp is a provider of 
interactive computer services, and that she is seeking to treat them as 
publishers or speakers of information provided by readers. (A00486:27-
A00488:13.) Hassell argued, however, that Yelp should not be immune 
because it "is actively participating in promoting the defamation of 
Plaintiffs." A00486: 19-20. While Hassell did not analyze the provisions of 
Section 230 or rely on any case law, she seemed to be articulating an 
argument that Yelp was an "information content provider," and was 
therefore not shielded from liability. The statute defines an information 
36 
content provider as any party "responsible ... in part" for the "creation or 
development of information." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 
Hassell claimed that Yelp's alleged active participation took two 
forms. First, she claimed that by applying its automated software to 
distinguish between "non-recommended reviews" and "recommended 
reviews," Yelp is an "active participant here, publishing information itself 
recommending some reviews, over other reviews." A00487:21-22. She 
claimed that "Yelp is expressing an opinion and affecting the opinion of 
others by its act of recommending this review and deciding which reviews 
will affect a 'Yelp rating' and which will not." A00487:25-27. Second, she 
claimed that Yelp's Terms of Service grant Yelp such an "extraordinary" 
license to the rights in reviews that Yelp "effectively claims ownership of 
the user's reviews to do as it wishes with them." A00487: 1-5. She 
concluded that this somehow results in Yelp "adopt[ing] Ms. Bird's legally 
declared defamatory statement in full, despite having the ability to remove 
or alter the review ... " A00487:7-9. Hassell's arguments fail because 
neither Yelp's automated software, nor the scope of its license, is sufficient 
to tum Yelp into an "information content provider," as required to defeat 
immunity. 
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A. Yelp's Practice of"Recommending" Reviews Is a 
Traditional Editorial Function Immunized by Section 230. 
California courts, like those throughout the country, have squarely 
rejected the same over-reaching theory of liability on which Hassell relies, 
and instead adopted a "restrictive definition" of an "information content 
provider" to narrow the kind of conduct a defendant must engage in before 
losing its immunity under Section 230. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123. 
For example, in Carafano, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant 
did not facilitate the development of offending content where it provided 
users with a "detailed questionnaire" that included multiple-choice 
questions wherein members selected answers from menus providing 
between four and nineteen options that were capable of resulting in libelous 
profiles. !d. at 1121. In Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561, 
572-73 (2009) the Court found a web site, as a publisher of third-party 
content, had immunity, and that the decision "to restrict or make available 
certain material - is expressly covered by section 230." In Goddard v. 
Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1196-97 (N.D. Cal. 2009), the court 
held that "a website operator does not become liable as an 'information 
content provider' merely by 'augmenting the content [of online material] 
generally."' (citation omitted). In Hupp v. Freedom Commc'ns, Inc., 221 
Cal. App. 4th 398, 400, 405 (2013), the Court held that Section 230 barred 
a lawsuit where the plaintiff alleged a newspaper "breached its user 
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agreement with [plaintiff] by failing to remove comments made on their 
website concerning" him where the comments were written and posted by 
third parties. In Delfino v. Agilent Techs .• Inc., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790, 807-
08 (2006), the Court held that Section 230 iimnunity applied to claims 
brought by recipients of Internet threats against the transmitter of threats 
and his employer, whose computer system he used. In Barnes v. Yahoo!, 
Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit found Yahoo 
immune where it failed to remove from its website material that was 
harmful to plaintiff and "a dangerous, cruel, and highly indecent use of the 
internet." 10 
These decisions are part of a national consensus that Section 230 
provides immunity even where a website "has an active, even aggressive 
role in making available content prepared by others." Blumenthal v. 
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998). See also M.A. v. Village Voice 
10 Similarly, in Donato v. Moldow, 374 N.J. Super. 475,499 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2005), New Jersey's highest court held that a website 
operator was not an "information content provider" where it selectively 
deleted reader posts while allowing others to remain. In Shiamili v. Real 
Estate Group ~fN Y., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281, 285 (Ct. App. 2011), New 
York's highest court held that a website that "promoted" a user's allegedly 
defamatory comment to a stand-alone post, and accompanied the post with 
an insulting illustration, remained immune from suit under Section 230. 
While the website did provide some content, the Court held that the "added 
headings and illustration do not materially contribute to the defamatory 
nature of the third-party statements." !d. at 293. In Doe v. Am. Online, 
Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (2001), the Florida Supreme Court found an Internet 
service provider immune from claims of negligence by a mother who 
alleged that a user had marketed obscene photographs and videotapes of 
mother's minor son on the service provider's chat rooms. 
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Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1049 (E.D. Mo. 2011) 
(finding Backpage immune under Section 230, rejecting plaintiffs 
arguments that search functions and ad revenue optimization methods 
transformed it into a content provider); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. 
Supp. 2d 961, 966 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (similar holding). In keeping with this 
consensus, the California Supreme Court specifically held that there is no 
"operative distinction between 'active' and 'passive' Internet use" for 
purposes of applying immunity under Section 230. Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 
62. It reasoned that a "user who actively selects and posts material based 
on its content fits well within the traditional role of 'publisher.' Congress 
has exempted that role from liability." !d. at 62. It further noted that were 
it to depart from the national consensus that active service providers are 
immune, it would be encouraging forum shopping. !d. at 58. 
Courts have repeatedly and consistently found that the exact conduct 
Hassell identifies here- Yelp's practice of separating out non-
recommended reviews - is merely a traditional editorial function, and does 
not serve to defeat Yelp's immunity under Section 230. For example, in 
Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., No. C-10-1321 EMC, 2011 WL 5079526 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 26, 2011), affirmed on other grounds, 765 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2014), 
the court found that "Yelp's alleged manipulation of [Plaintiffs'] review 
pages - by removing certain reviews and publishing others or changing 
their order of appearance - falls within the conduct immunized by § 
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230( c)( I)." !d. at *6. That is because lawsuits "seeking to hold a service 
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions 
-such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content-
are barred." !d., citing Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th 
Cir. 1997). 
Similarly, in Braverman v. Yelp, Inc., No. 155629112,2013 WL 
3335071 (NY. Sup. Ct. June 28, 2013), the court found that "Yelp's alleged 
act of filtering out positive reviews does not make Yelp the creator or 
developer of the alleged defamatory reviews. Yelp's choice to publish 
certain reviews- whether positive or negative- is an exercise of a 
publisher's traditional editorial function protected by the CDA." 
Braverman, 2011 WL 3335071 at *3, citing Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d at 
1030 and Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). 
In Reit v. Yelp!, Inc., 29 Misc. 3d 713, 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010), a 
New York court found that allegations that Yelp's business plan included 
removing positive reviews of businesses who refused to advertise, even if 
true (which Yelp denied), could not negate the immunity provided by 
Section 230. The court specifically held that the act of selecting which 
material to publish is the publisher's quintessential role and a website will 
not lose its immunity for acting as a publisher. See 29 Misc.3d at 717, 907 
N.Y.S.2d at 414 (citing Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465,471 (3d 
Cir. 2003)). 
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And in Kimzey v. Yelp Inc., No. C13-1734 RAJ, 2014 WL 1805551 
(W.D. Wash. May 7, 20 14), a plaintiff sued Yelp for libel based on the 
display of a review strikingly similar to Birdzeye B's, capitals and all. The 
court found that Section 230 applied to bar the defamation claims, and that 
because the user "Sarah K." posted the review, Yelp could not quality as 
the information content provider of the reviews, regardless of its provision 
of a star rating system. 
Here, Hassell's claims are no different than those that came before it. 
She alleges that "Yelp's actions of specifically categorizing reviews, 
recommending and making Ms. Bird's review more visible than others 
precludes Yelp in this case from 47 USC 230 §(c)(!) protection." 
A00487:27-28. Thus, Hassell identifies the same editorial conduct that no 
less than four courts have each specifically found to be immunized, and that 
the California Supreme Court generally found exempted from liability, i.e., 
actively selecting and posting material based on its content. Barrett, 40 
Cal. 4th at 62. Moreover, conduct far more aggressive and active than this 
consistently has been found to be immunized: Yelp did not sponsor the 
review, add content to it, or solicit the specific content of the review with a 
questionnaire. Because Yelp's conduct of categorizing reviews and making 
some more visible than others is merely an exercise of a publisher's 
traditional editorial function, it is entirely protected by Section 230. 
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B. Yelp's Standard License Contained in Its Terms of 
Service Does Not Transform Yelp into a Content 
Provider. 
Nor can Yelp's Terms of Service, which grant Yelp a non-exclusive 
license to use user -submitted content - a license that Yelp uses to display 
others' content on its website- transform Yelp into an information content 
provider and deprive it of Section 230 immunity. Hassell provided no case 
law to support the notion that Yelp can become a content provider merely 
through license terms. And indeed, licensing content is not the equivalent 
of creating or developing it for purposes of Section 230. The ruling in 
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44,49-52 (D.D.C. 1998), is 
instructive. There, AOL had a license agreement with Matt Drudge to 
provide the "Drudge Report" for AOL in exchange for a salary. The 
agreement "by its terms contemplates more than a passive role for AOL; in 
it, AOL reserves the 'right to remove, or direct [Drudge] to remove, any 
content which, as reasonably detennined by AOL ... violates AOL's then-
standard Terms of Service ... "'. I d. at 51. Additionally, AOL was aware of 
the Drudge Report's propensity for gossip, issuing a press release stating 
that, "AOL has made Matt Drudge instantly accessible to members who 
crave instant gossip and news breaks." Jd. Nonetheless, despite this active 
role and the direct financial benefit to AOL, the court held that AOL was 
immune from suit under Section 230 for claims related to the Drudge 
Report. The court noted that as a matter of policy, "Congress decided not 
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to treat providers of interactive computer services like other information 
providers such as newspapers, magazines or television and radio stations, 
all of which may be held liable for publishing or distributing obscene or 
defamatory material written or prepared by others." !d. at 49. 
Far from the facts of Blumenthal, in which AOL entered an 
exclusive license with Drudge knowing in advance the type of content it 
was buying, all Hassell alleges is that Yelp's standard Terms of Service 
includes a broad license to all reviews on its website, which enables Yelp to 
publish them. Yelp is not aware of any court ever denying Section 230 
immunity based on licensing tenns, much less the standard tenns at issue 
here. If these standard Terms of Service were sufficient to transform Yelp 
into a content provider, then it would be a content provider for every 
statement posted on Yelp based on the mere existence of the licensing 
provisions that enable it to publish that content, a nonsensical result entirely 
incompatible with the purpose of Section 230. 
C. Yelp's Refusal to Remove the Review Pending Resolution 
oflts Motion to Vacate, and Its Challenge to the 
Unconstitutional Injunction, Have No Bearing on Its 
Immunity Under Section 230. 
In denying Yelp's motion to vacate the injunction, the trial court did 
not address Section 230 or explain how its findings overcame the immunity 
provided under the statute. Instead, it found only that the injunction could 
apply to Yelp, as a non-party, because it deemed Yelp to be "aiding and 
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abetting Bird's violation of the injunction." It listed three findings in 
support of this conclusion. None of the three provide a basis to overcome 
Yelp's immunity under Section 230. 
The first basis was that Yelp designated B irdzeye B.'s review as a 
"recommended review." A00809:12-16. As explained above (see supra 
Argument II.A), Yelp's practice of displaying recommended reviews 
separate from non-recommended reviews is merely an exercise of Yelp's 
editorial control and cannot defeat Yelp's immunity under Section 230. 
Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 62. 
The remaining findings address Yelp's conduct well after the content 
at issue was posted on Yelp and the injnnction had issued. The trial court's 
second basis was that Yelp was "acting on behalf of Bird" by moving the 
court to set aside the judgment in its entirety, and questioning whether 
Hassell provided adequate notice to Bird of the Action. A00809:16-
A00810:2. As discussed above, (see supra Argument l.B), Yelp's conduct 
in this litigation provides no grounds for denying the motion to vacate. The 
third basis was that Yelp refused to delete the reviews prior to a judicial 
determination of its motion to vacate the injunction. A0081 0:3-6. But this 
also cannot defeat the immunity that Section 230 provides to Yelp. 
The law is clear that a service provider is immune from liability for 
content it does not create or develop, even where it refuses to remove that 
content after receiving notice to do so. MA. v. Village Voice Media, 809 F. 
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Supp. 2d at I 051 ("[E]ven if a service provider knows that third parties are 
posting illegal content, the service provider's failure to intervene is 
immunized,") (citation and internal quotation omitted); Universal Commc'n 
Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Section 230 
immunity applies even after notice of the potentially unlawful nature of the 
third-party content."; no liability even where provider was allegedly 
"manifestly aware" of the unlawful speech); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 
F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (no liability where AOL delayed in taking down 
allegedly defamatory messages and failed to screen for similar postings 
thereafter). Thus, even if a provider has actual knowledge that third parties 
are posting illegal content, "the service provider's failure to intervene is 
immunized." Goddard, 2008 WL 5245490, at *3; see also Gregerson v. 
Vilano Fin., Inc., No. 06-1164 ADM/AJB, 2008 WL 451060, at *9 n.3 (D. 
Minn. Feb. 15, 2008) (upholding Section 230 immunity even after website 
operator was made aware of objections to third-party comments posted on 
site); see Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 108 Wash. App. 454,463-64 
(200 I) (Amazon entitled to Section 230 immunity even though plaintiff 
provided notice of unlawful content and Amazon failed to remove it). 
In Barrett v. Rosenthal, the Supreme Court explained at length why 
Section 230 immunizes websites from liability for their conduct after they 
have received notice that they are hosting defamatory material. First, 
notice liability "would provide a natural incentive to simply remove 
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messages upon notification, chilling the freedom oflnternet speech." 40 
Cal. 4th at 54-55. Second, "notice-based liability would deter service 
providers from actively screening the content of material posted on its 
service, because discovering potentially defamatory material would only 
increase the provider's liability." !d. at 55. Third, notice-based liability 
"would allow complaining parties to impose substantial burdens on the 
freedom of Internet speech by lodging complaints whenever they were 
displeased by an online posting." !d. at 57. The Supreme Court noted that 
the "volume and range oflnternet communications make the 'heckler's 
veto' a real threat" under a notice-based liability rule, and that the United 
States Supreme Court "has cautioned against reading the CDA to confer 
such a broad power of censorship on those offended by Internet speech." 
!d. 
Under this uniform authority, Yelp cannot be enjoined. Regardless 
of whether or not Yelp removed the Birdzeye B. posting, and regardless of 
what arguments it made in challenging the validity of the injunction against 
it, it did not create the posts at issue, and is therefore immune from liability 
under Section 230. Any other holding would confer the power of 
censorship on plaintiffs like Hassell. Her reward for denying Yelp its due 
process should not be the ability to censor Yelp while Yelp appeals the 
injunction. 
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III. THE INJUNCTION AGAINST YELP IS AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINT 
The i~unction requires non-party Yelp to banish all record of not 
just Birdzeye B's first review, but also two additional comments from two 
different user accounts that were not properly before the trial court- one of 
which was written after the Complaint was filed and served. Even more 
egregiously, the injunction seeks to ban non-party Yelp from publishing 
future comments from these two users, regardless of what they may write -
whether true statements, constitutionally protected opinion, or even an 
absolutely privileged fair and true report of judicial proceedings. 
Such an order would "freeze[]," not just chill, Yelp's exercise of its 
rights to publish comments that already exist and future writings. See 
Nebraska Press Ass 'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (!976). "The right to 
free speech is ... one of the cornerstones of our society," and is protected 
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and under an 
"even broader" provision of the California Constitution. Hurvitz v. 
Hoejjlin, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1232, 1241 (2000); see Cal. Const., art. I,§ 2, 
subd. (a).) The California Constitution provides that: "Every person may 
freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments, on all subjects, being 
responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge 
liberty of speech or press." Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (a). As the 
California Supreme Court held long ago, "[t]he wording of this section is 
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terse and vigorous, and its meaning so plain that construction is not needed. 
The right of the citizen to freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments is 
unlimited .... He shall have no censor over him to whom he must apply for 
permission to speak, write, or publish .... " Dailey v. Superior Court, 112 
Cal. 94, 97 (1896). 
An injunction that forbids a citizen from speaking is known as a 
"prior restraint." Evans v. Evans, 162 Cal. App. 4th 1157, 1169 (2008) 
(finding that a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendant in that case 
from making defamatory statements was unconstitutional). A prior 
restraint on expression "comes ... with a 'heavy presumption' against its 
constitutional validity." Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 
415,419 (!971) (citation omitted); accord Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 
372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Maggi v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 4th 1218, 
1225 (2004). This antipathy toward prior restraints remains strong even 
where substantial competing interests are asserted. See Near v. State of 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 704-705 (1931) (rejecting restraint on publication 
of any periodical containing "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" 
matter). For example, in Nebraska Press, the United States Supreme Court 
rejected a prior restraint against the publication of a criminal defendant's 
murder confession, even though the Court found that such publicity "might 
impair the defendant's right to a fair trial" under the Sixth Amendment. 
427 U.S. at 563. Likewise, the Supreme Court repeatedly has found that 
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First Amendment rights to publish must prevail even in cases involving 
such strong interests as the confidentiality of rape victims, Cox Broad. 
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (invalidating Georgia law 
restricting publication of rape victim's name), Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 
U.S. 524, 536 (1989) (involving publication of a rape victim's name), and 
the interest in protecting minors charged with murder, Okla. Pub! 'g Co. v. 
Dist. Court for Okla. Cnty., 430 U.S. 308, 311 (1977). 
Below, Hassell relied entirely on Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. 
Lemen, 40 Cal. 4th 1141 (2007), a case arising under a unique set offacts 
not presented by this case, and which supports a finding that the injunction 
issued against Yelp is overbroad and unconstitutional. In Balboa Island, 
the California Supreme Court held that a court may enjoin the repetition of 
a statement "which a jury has detennined to be defamatory." !d. at 1158. It 
also held that "it is crucial to distinguish requests for preventive relief prior 
to trial and post-trial remedies to prevent repetition of statements judicially 
determined to be defamatory." !d. at 1158. The Supreme Court found the 
injunction in Balboa Island to be invalid because it was "broader than 
necessary to provide relief to plaintiff while minimizing the restriction of 
expression." !d. at 1160. Specifically, it applied not just to the defendant 
but also to "all other persons in active concert and participation with her," 
when there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that anyone 
other than the defendant had made the defamatory statements. !d. at 1160. 
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In addition, it prohibited defendant from making privileged statements, 
such as "presenting her grievances to government officials," which the 
Supreme Court noted is among the most precious of the liberties 
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. Id. at 1160. 
Under Balboa Island, the trial court's injunction here is 
impermissibly broad. Even assuming that Birdzeye B' s first statement may 
be enjoined after a default judgment rather than a jury trial determination-
although the Supreme Court in Balboa Island carefully limited its narrow 
holding to judgments entered after a jury trial (40 Cal. 4th at 1158)- the 
trial court plainly erred in refusing to vacate the injunction to the extent it 
applies to future statements. Indeed, the injunction is so broad as to ban 
any "subsequent comments of the reviewer," either Birdzeye B. or J.D., 
regardless of what either of them write. That would include statements 
regarding the judicial proceedings, which are privileged under Civil Code 
Section 47(d). Because the injunction against future comments is not 
limited to repetition of defamatory statements, it is impermissibly 
overbroad and unconstitutional. See Balboa Island, 40 Cal. 4th at 1160. 
In addition, the injunction purports to enjoin two statements that 
were not properly before the trial court. One of those two statements, 
Birdzeye B's comment on the litigation, had not been posted at the time 
Hassell filed and served her Complaint, which was never amended to 
include the subsequent comment. And while Hassell had included J.D.'s 
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statement in the Complaint, she did not identify those statements with 
particularity as part of her libel claim as required to obtain an injunction. 
See Oakley, Inc. v. McWilliams, No. CV 09-07666 DDP (RNBx), 2011 WL 
4352408, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011). In Oakley, the court found that 
"unlike in Balboa Island, the defamatory statements at issue have not been 
identified with sufficient particularity to rule on them one by one." !d. It 
held that "[w]ithout argument and a record that permits the court to 
consider Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction enjoining 
Defendant's speech on a statement by statement [basis], the court is not in a 
position to consider Defendants' request." !d. Similarly here, the court 
lacked a record to permit it to legitimately enjoin either the J.D. statement, 
or BirdzeyeB's second comment. 
For these reasons, the First Amendment plainly bars the injunctive 
relief the trial court granted against Yelp. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because Yelp received no notice of the injunction against it, in 
breach of its due process rights; and because Section 230 bars the 
injunction; and because the injunction is so broad as to constitute an 
unconstitutional prior restraint, this Court should reverse the denial of 
Yelp's motion to vacate the judgment. 
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